Contests with Linear Externality in Prizes by Park, Sung-Hoon & Lee, Sanghack
Contests with Linear Externality  
in Prizes 
Sung-Hoon Park and Sanghack Lee
This study examines contests in which prizes are affected linearly 
by aggregate effort. In particular, this research analyzes a contest 
among individuals as a benchmark to scrutinize the effects of 
prize externality and sharing-rule information on rent-dissipation 
rate and social welfare. Thereafter, the current study investigates 
two types of group contest with linear prize externality: one with 
private information on intra-group sharing rules and the other with 
public information on intra-group sharing rules. Results indicate as 
follows. (1) An increase in prize externality increases rent-dissipation 
rate but has no effect on social welfare. (2) The group contest with 
private information on sharing rules yields higher social welfare and 
lower rent-dissipation rate than the one with public information on 
sharing rules. 
Keywords:  Group contest, Linear externality in prize, Intra-group 
sharing rule, Private information on sharing rules, 
Public information on sharing rules 
JEL Classification: D72
Sung-Hoon Park, Professor, Department of Economics, Chosun 
University, 309 Pilmun-daero, Dong-gu, Gwangju, 501-759, South 
Korea. (Email) park@chosun.ac.kr, (Tel) +82-62-230-6839; Sanghack 
Lee, Corresponding author, Professor, Department of International 
Commerce, Kookmin University, 77 Jeongneung-ro, Seongbuk-gu, 
Seoul 136-702, South Korea. (Email) slee@kookmin.ac.kr, (Tel) +82-2-
910-4546.
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive 
comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are our own 
responsibility.
[Seoul Journal of Economics 2019, Vol. 32, No. 3]
324 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
I. Introduction 
Many economic, political, and social phenomena can be modeled 
as contests, in which players expend effort to win prizes. Examples 
of these contests include elections, environmental conflicts, fund 
raising competitions among charity organizations, labor tournaments, 
litigations, lottery competitions, R&D competitions, sports events, and 
war of attrition. Given the importance of such contests, many scholars 
have analyzed them under various contexts. In particular, the “lottery” 
model of Tullock (1980) has been extended in various directions by Dixit 
(1987), Ellingsen (1991), Konrad (2004), Baik and Lee (2007), Kolmar 
and Rommeswinkel (2013), and Topolyan (2014). 
The majority of the related studies have assumed that the size of 
a prize is given exogenously. However, the prizes of many contests 
are affected by aggregate effort. Several studies have reflected on this 
idea and examined contests in which prizes or costs are affected by 
aggregate effort. Examples of these studies are Chung (1996), Lee and 
Kang (1998), Eggert and Kolmar (2006), Shaffer (2006), Lee (2000, 2007), 
Cohen et al. (2008), and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011). The contests 
that they have examined can be classified into two types. In one set of 
contests, only prize winners are affected by externalities. By contrast, 
all players in the other set of contests are affected by externalities 
regardless of whether they are prize winners (Hereafter, the former and 
latter are called contests with prize and cost externalities, respectively). 
Contests with prize externality are ubiquitous. For example, the prize 
money of a lottery winner depends on the number of people buying 
lottery tickets and their total expenditure. The more people buying 
tickets, the larger the money for the winner (Chung 1996, p. 57). 
Another example is a labor tournament. A typical labor tournament 
rewards behavior that increases an employer’s productivity, thereby 
augmenting the total surplus available to all members of the 
organization (Shaffer 2006, p. 251). Chung (1996), Eggert and Kolmar 
(2006), Shaffer (2006), and Cohen et al. (2008) examine contests with 
prize externality. 
Lee and Kang (1998) and Lee (2000, 2007) investigate contests with 
cost externality. Examples of such contests are Olympic sporting events. 
Lee and Kang (1998) noted that participants in the Olympics may enjoy 
a feeling of pride or accomplishment regardless of whether they win 
a medal. The pride of the participants in such contests is likely to be 
325CONTESTS WITH LINEAR EXTERNALITY IN PRIZES
positively correlated to the aggregate effort expended in the contests (Lee 
and Kang 1998, p. 728). 
The current study focuses on contests in which prizes are affected 
linearly by the aggregate effort. Chung (1996) analyzes the effect of 
prize externality and shows that rent-dissipation rate, which is the ratio 
of the aggregate resources expended relative to the prize, increases 
when the prize increases with effort. While Chung (1996) analyzes a 
contest with a strictly positive non-linear spillover, the present research 
scrutinizes a contest with a linear prize externality that can be either 
positive or negative. The current study is related to Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta (2011), which examine contests in which players’ payoffs are 
linear functions of prizes, own effort, and effort of rivals. Their model 
can represent various contests through parameter modifications. 
The present research is also related to Lee and Kang (1998) because 
individual and group contests are examined. Lee and Kang (1998) 
introduce a group contest with public information sharing rules and 
strictly linear externalities. However, their analysis is confined to group 
contests with public information on intra-group sharing rules. The 
current research examines group contests with private information on 
intra-group sharing rules and with public information. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
examines the individual contest with linear prize externality. We find 
that an increase in prize externality increases rent-dissipation rate 
but has no effect on social welfare in the individual contest. Section 
III analyzes two types of group contest with prize externality: one 
with private information on intra-group sharing rules and the other 
with public information on intra-group sharing rules. We obtain the 
equilibrium sharing rules, equilibrium outlays, rent dissipation rate, 
and social welfare under private and public information on intra-
group sharing rules. Section IV compares the results derived from the 
analysis and presents the following outcomes. First, the equilibrium 
sharing rules and total outlays are less in the group contest with 
private information on sharing rules than in the group contest with 
public information. Second, the group contest with private information 
on sharing rules yields lower rent dissipation and higher social welfare 
than the one with public information on sharing rules. Section V 
presents the concluding remarks.
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II. Individual contest with linear prize externality
Consider a contest in which N risk-neutral players compete to win a 
prize the size of which is endogenously determined. Let v be a basic (or 
initial) prize in the contest. Each player’s outlay is denoted by xh (h = 
1, 2, 3, …, N). We assume that aggregate outlays generate externalities 
in the form of a change in the size of a prize. That is, the endogenously 
determined prize is given by v + γ∑hxh. The parameter γ denotes the 
degree to which the prize is affected linearly by the aggregate effort and 
– 1 < γ < 1. As in Tullock (1980), player h’s probability of winning the 
prize ph is given by his or her outlay relative to the aggregate outlays as 
follows:
  ph = xh /X,  if X > 0 and (1)
 = 0  if X = 0, 
where X ( = ∑ j xj) denotes the aggregate outlays.
Thereafter, player h’s expected payoff Gh is given as follows:
 Gh = ph(v + γX – xh) + (1 – ph)( – xh)
         = phv – (1 – γ)xh. 
(2)
When 0 < γ < 1, positive externality is present in the contest. However, 
if – 1 < γ < 0, then the contest is associated with negative externality. 
Shaffer (2006) notes that military conflicts would fit into this type of 
contest. In military conflicts, contenders may bombard enemy facilities, 
thereby reducing the size of the prize they could claim after winning the 
conflict. The fiercer the military conflict, the smaller the prize for the 
winner. When γ is zero, v is the prize with no externality in the contest. 
This interpretation appears valid in such contests as the previously 
mentioned labor tournament. 
Each player is assumed to behave in a Cournot–Nash manner. That 
is, each player decides the level of one’s own outlay, taking all the other 
players’ outlays as given. The first-order conditions are as follows:  
 (X – xh)v/X
2 – (1 – γ) = 0,  for h = 1, 2, 3, …, N. (3)
The second-order conditions are as follows:  
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 – 2(X – xh)v/X
3 < 0,  for h = 1, 2, 3, …, N. (4)
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium actions. Thus, we obtain the 
following by summing (3) over h and simplifying:
 xE = (N – 1)v/{N2(1 – γ)} and XE = (N – 1)v/{N(1 – γ)}, (5)
thereby implying that ∂xE/∂γ = (N – 1)v/{N2(1 – γ)2} > 0, ∂XE/∂γ = (N – 1)v/
{N(1 – γ)2} > 0; and ∂xE/∂N = – (N – 2)v/{N3(1 – γ)} < 0 and ∂XE/∂N = v/{N2(1 
– γ)} > 0. An increase in positive externality augments the individual 
outlay and aggregate outlays. As the number of players increases, the 
individual outlay decreases and the aggregate outlays increase. 
We now consider the rent-dissipation rate RDE = XE/(v + γXE). The 
rent-dissipation rate is given as follows:
 RDE = (N – 1)/(N – γ), (6)
thereby implying that ∂RDE/∂γ = (N – 1)/(N – γ)2 > 0 and ∂RDE/∂N = (1 – γ)/
(N – γ)2 > 0.
Lastly, we analyze the expected payoffs for the players and social 
welfare in equilibrium. We denote social welfare by WE = ∑hGh. The 
respective payoffs for player h and social welfare are as follows:
 GE = v/N2 and WE = v/N. (7)
The expected payoff does not depend on externality parameter γ but 
on the number of players N. That is, ∂GE/∂γ = 0 and ∂GE/∂N = –2v/N3 < 
0. Evidently, the comparative static effects of externality and number 
of players on social welfare can be easily derived as follows: ∂WE/∂γ = 0 
and ∂WE/∂N = – v/N2 < 0. 
III. Group contest with linear externality
This section examines group contests in which players compete 
by expending outlay and choosing sharing-rule parameter to win 
endogenous prizes. Each group consists of n risk-neutral members, 
where n ≥ 2 and the total population is denoted by N = 2n. Member k of 
group i ( = 1, 2) contributes xki to his own group. Group i expends in the 
aggregate Xi ( = ∑kxki). The total outlay of the two groups is denoted by 
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X ( = X1 + X2). The probability of group i winning the prize pi is given as 
follows:
 pi = Xi /X, (8)
where Xi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, and X > 0. If X1 = X2 = 0, then we assume that 
p1 = p2 = 1/2.
The members of the winning group i share the prize v + γ(Xi + Xj) 
among themselves, for i = 1, 2. The fractional share of member k of 
winning group i is denoted as follows:
 σki = δixki /Xi + (1 – δi)/n, (9)
where δi may exceed 1, which is similar to Baik and Lee (1997) and 
Lee and Kang (1998). The sharing rule of group i is represented by the 
parameter δi, which is chosen by the group members at the beginning of 
the contest. Moreover, δi = 0 implies that players of the winning group 
share the prize equally regardless of their individual outlays expended. 
A low value of δi implies minimal emphasis on the relative outlay in 
determining individual share. By contrast, a high value of δi implies 
substantial emphasis on the relative outlay. In addition, δi = 1 implies 
that each player’s share of the prize depends only on his outlay relative 
to his group’s total outlays. 
The contest is associated with externality because each member’s real 
prize is affected by the aggregate outlays. The expected payoff to member 
k of group i(i.e., Gki) is given as follows:
 Gki = pi[σki{v + γ(Xi + Xj)} – xki] + (1 – pi)[– xki]
       = piσki{v + γ(Xi + Xj)} – xki,  for i ≠ j. 
(10)
The payoff function in (10) can be viewed similar to that in the group 
contest, in which each member of the winning group i obtains a 
percentage of the aggregate effort as externality effect and receives 
a percentage of the basic prize on the basis of the sharing rule. This 
interpretation appears valid in such situations as groups’ competition 
to obtain the aforementioned grant. Each group consisting of the 
fixed number of institutions expends effort to increase its likelihood of 
winning the grant. Each group distributes the basic grant and matching 
funds from the government among the institutions in the group on the 
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basis of the pre-specified intra-group sharing rule. 
The sharing rules in group contests are either private or public 
information. Section III, A examines the contest when the sharing rules 
are private information. Section III, B analyzes the contest with public 
information sharing rules.
A. Contest with private information sharing rules
Consider the following game. First, the members of each group 
decide how to share the prize if they win. That is, they make a binding 
agreement on the value of their sharing-rule parameter δ. Given 
that the members of each group are identical, their decision on δ is 
unanimous. Thereafter, all members of both groups expend their 
outlays simultaneously and independently. When expending their 
outlays, the members of each group know their own sharing rule but 
do not know the rival group’s sharing rule. Lastly, the winning group is 
chosen and the members of this group share the prize on the basis of 
their previously agreed-upon sharing rule. We assume that negotiating 
an agreement and sharing the prize do not incur any transaction cost. 
We also assume that the preceding aspects are common knowledge 
among the members.
Working backward, we first consider the members’ decisions on their 
outlays. After observing his group’s sharing rule or equivalently δi, 
member k of group i maximizes Gki by choosing the level of xki. The first-
order condition to maximize Gki is as follows:
 {Xjσki/X2 + δi(Xi – xki)/XiX}{v + γX} + γσki      Xi/X – 1 = 0,
     for k = 1, 2, 3,…, n. 
(11)
The second-order condition is as follows:
  –2Xjσkiv/X3 – 2δi(Xi – xki)v/{Xi X2} < 0,  
 for k = 1, 2, 3,…, n, and for i ≠ j. (12)
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium actions. Thus, xki = xi is denoted 
for all k. Thereafter, the first-order condition is reduced as follows:
      {v + γn(xi + xj)}{xj + δi(n – 1)(xi + xj)}
 /{n2(xi + xj)2} + γxi/{n(xi + xj)} – 1 = 0,  for i ≠ j. 
(13)
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From (13), we obtain the following best response function:
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Thereafter, we consider the members’ decision on their sharing rule. 
Given that the members expend the same outlay, they have the same 
expected payoff: Gki = Gi for all k. The members seek to maximize as 
follows:
   Gi(δi, xj) = [{v + γn{xi(δi, xj) + xj}}/{n{xi(δi, xj) + xj}} – 1] 
         xi(δi, xj),  for i ≠ j 
(15)
with respect to δi, taking group j's total outlay Xj (or xj) as given. Note 
that we obtain (15) by substituting (14) into (10). From the first-order 
condition for maximizing Gi(δi, xj), we obtain the following best response 
function of group i:
 
2( ) { (1 ) } / {(1 ) }.i j j j jx nx nx v v nxδ γ γ γ γ= - + - - -  (16)
The second-order condition is satisfied.1 Lastly, we obtain the symmetric 
equilibrium actions, which is the 2(n + 1)-tuple vector of actions (δ1*, 
x1*, …, x1*, δ2*, x2*, …, x2*), by simultaneously solving the system of four 
equations: x1(δ1, x2), δ1(x2), x2(δ2, x1), and δ2(x1). By substituting (16) into 
(14), we obtain x1(x2) and x2(x1).
2 Given that we focus on the symmetric 
equilibrium actions, the players expend the same outlay and choose the 
same sharing-rule parameters. Thus, let x1* = x2* = x* and δ1* = δ2* = δ
*. 
We obtain the following by solving x1(x2) and x2(x1): 
 x* = v/{4n(1 – γ)} and X * = v/{2(1 – γ)}, (17)
thereby implying that ∂x*/∂γ = v/{4n(1 – γ)2} > 0, ∂X*/∂γ = v/{2(1 – γ)2} > 0; 
1 We use the computer program Maple to solve for the second-order condition. 
For concise exposition, we do not provide the expression for the second-order 
condition. This information is available from the authors upon request.
2 We use Maple to solve for x1(x2) and x2(x1).
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and ∂x*/∂N = v/{2N 2(1 – γ)} > 0 and ∂X*/∂N = 0. We substitute x* into (16) 
and obtain as follows:
 δ* = 1/(2 – γ), (18)
thereby implying ∂δ*/∂γ = 1/(2 – γ)2 > 0 and ∂δ*/∂N = 0. The sharing-
rule parameter is less than the unity for – 1 < γ < 1. For negative 
externalities γ < 0, we have δ* < 1/2. That is, the relative outlay is 
minimally emphasized in determining individual share. For positive 
externalities γ > 0, we have 1/2 < δ* < 1, which indicates substantial 
emphasis on the relative outlay. 
We analyze the rent-dissipation rate RD* = X*/(v + γX*). The rent-
dissipation rate is given as follows:
 RD* = 1/{2(1 – γ)}, (19)
thereby implying that ∂RD*/∂γ = 1/{2(1 – γ)2} > 0 and ∂RD*/∂n = 0. 
Lastly, we derive the expected payoffs for the players and social 
welfare. We denote social welfare in equilibrium by W * = ∑kGk1
* + ∑kGk2
*. 
The respective payoffs for a member of group i and the social welfare in 
equilibrium are as follows:
 G* = v/(2N) and W* = v/2. (20)
The expected payoff does not depend on externality parameter γ but on 
the number of players N. That is, ∂G*/∂γ = 0 and ∂G*/∂N = –v/(2N2) < 0. 
Hence, the comparative statics on social welfare, such as ∂W*/∂γ = 0 and 
∂W*/∂N = 0, can be easily derived. 
B. Contest with public information sharing rules
Consider the contest that is nearly the same as the one in Section III, 
A with the only difference being that the sharing rule of the rival group 
is public information. In particular, we consider the following two-stage 
game. In the first stage, the members of each group decide how to share 
the prize if they win. Thereafter, both groups simultaneously announce 
their sharing-rule parameter values that were chosen independently. That 
is, group i publicly announces the value of δi, for i = 1, 2. In the second 
stage, all the players in both groups expend their outlays simultaneously 
and independently after determining the parameter values. At the end of 
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the second stage, the winning group is chosen and its members share the 
augmented prize on the basis of the sharing rule chosen in the first stage. 
We employ subgame-perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. 
First, consider the second stage. By using (14), we obtain: 
 x1(δ1, δ2) = {(δ1 + δ2)(n – 1) + 1}[{(δ1 – δ2)n – γδ1}(n – 1) + n – γ]v




 x2(δ1, δ2) = {(δ1 + δ2)(n – 1) + 1}[{(δ2 – δ1)n – γδ2}(n – 1) + n – γ]v
   /[n{(δ1 + δ2)γ(n – 1) – 2(n – γ)}
2]. 
(22)
Let Gi(δi, δj) be the expected payoff of each member in group i at the 
equilibrium of the second stage. Consider the first stage of the game. By 
substituting x1(δ1, δ2) and x1(δ1, δ2) into (10), we obtain:
      Gi(δi, xj) = [{v + γn{xi(δi, δj) + xj(δi, δj)}
 /n{ xi(δi, δj) + xj(δi, δj)} – 1] xi(δi, δj),  for i ≠ j. 
(23)
The members of group i seek to maximize Gi(δi, δj), taking δj as given. 
From the first-order conditions for the maximization, we can derive δi(δj) 
as follows:
 δi(δj) = [δj2γ2 + {(n – 1)δj2 – (3n – 2)δj – 2}γ + 2n]
      /[γ2 – {(n – 1)δj + n + 2}γ + 2n]. 
(24)
The best response function of group i slopes upwards if γ < 0 and 
downwards if γ > 0. The implication is that the groups’ interactions 
exhibit characteristics of strategic complementarities for negative 
externality. Moreover, they exhibit characteristics of strategic 
substitutes for positive externality. We also find that the best response 
function of group i is 2/(2 – γ) ≥ 2/3 if δj = 0 and 1 if δj = 1. The players 
expend the same outlay and choose the same sharing-rule parameters 
on the symmetric equilibrium sharing-rule parameters. Thus, let δ1
** 
= δ2
** = δ**. From the first-order condition for maximizing Gi(δi, δj), we 
obtain: 
 δ** = 1, (25)
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thereby implying that player k’s share of the prize depends on his outlay 
relative to his group’s total outlays. Let x1
**
 = x2
** = x** for the symmetric 
equilibrium outlays. By substituting (25) into (21) and (22), we obtain: 
 x** = (N – 1)v/{N2(1 – γ)} and X** = (N – 1)v/{N(1 – γ)}, (26)
thereby implying that x** = xE and X** = XE. Moreover, ∂x**/∂γ > 0, ∂X**/∂γ 
> 0; and ∂x**/∂N < 0 and ∂X**/∂N > 0. 
We now analyze the real rent-dissipation rate RD** = X**/(v + γX**). 
The rent-dissipation rate is given as follows:
 RD** = (N – 1)/(N – γ), (27)
where RD** = RDE, and ∂RD**/∂γ = (N – 1)/(N – γ)2 > 0 and ∂RD**/∂N = (1 – γ)/
(N – γ)2 > 0.
Lastly, we analyze the expected payoffs for the players and social 
welfare. We denote social welfare in equilibrium by W** = ∑kGk1
** + ∑kGk2
**. 
Thereafter, the respective payoffs for a member of group i and social 
welfare in equilibrium are as follows:
 G** = v/N2 and W** = v/N. (28)
Evidently, G** = GE and W** = WE. The expected payoff does not depend 
on externality parameter γ but on the number of players N. That is, 
∂G**/∂γ = 0 and ∂G**/∂N = –2v/N3 < 0. The comparative statics on social 
welfare is similar to the payoff for each player. That is, ∂W**/∂γ = 0 and 
∂W**/∂N = –v/N2 < 0.
IV. Comparison of the two group contests
We compare the equilibrium sharing-rule parameters derived from 
the analysis of the two group contests. Lee and Kang (1998) examine a 
collective contest with public information on sharing rules and find that 
the equilibrium sharing-rule parameters are unity when the two groups 
are of the same size. That is, both groups choose a completely outlay-
based incentive scheme. We also show that the equilibrium sharing-
rule parameter is unity in the group contest with public information 
sharing rule. However, with private information on sharing rules, the 
parameter is constantly less than unity, which implies that δ* < δ**= 
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1. An interesting aspect is comparing the two equilibrium sharing-
rule parameters δ* and δ**. Intuitively, the sharing-rule parameter is 
naturally less than one half (i.e., δ* < 1/2) when negative externality 
is present and is larger than one half (i.e., δ* > 1/2) with positive 
externality. Such a situation is established in the private information 
contest, although it does not occur in the public information contest. 
Nevertheless, the equilibrium sharing-rule parameter is constantly 
unity regardless of the degree of the externality. This result can be 
explained as follows. We find that the groups’ interactions exhibit the 
characteristics of strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes 
for the negative and positive externalities, respectively, in public 
information contest. In addition, we have found that the best response 
function of group i is 2/(2 – γ) if δj = 0 and 1 if δj = 1. 
The rent-dissipation rates derived from individual contest and two 
group contests are as follows: RD* < RD** = RDE. The expected payoffs 
of the players and social welfare derived from individual contest and 
two group contests are as follows. First, comparing the expected payoffs 
of the players, we find that GE = G** < G*. Second, comparing social 
welfares, we find that WE = W** < W*. 
V. Concluding remarks
This study examined contests in which the contest process generates 
externality given by a linear function of aggregate effort. Such an 
externality is added to the prize. This research also compared rent 
dissipation and payoffs in equilibrium with the prize externality versus 
those without externality. Moreover, the current study used three 
models that incorporate the positive and negative externalities of effort. 
This study showed that an increase in prize externality increases 
the rent-dissipation rate but has no effect on social welfare. The rent-
dissipation rate and social welfare obtained from the individual contest 
are identical to those obtained from the group contest with public 
information on sharing rules. The equilibrium sharing-rule parameter 
with private information on sharing rules is found to be smaller than 
the sharing-rule parameter with public information on sharing rules. 
This research also demonstrated that rent dissipation in the collective 
contest with private information sharing rules is less than that in the 
collective contest with public information sharing rules. Lastly, this 
study showed that social welfare in the collective contest with private 
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information sharing rules is greater than that in the collective contest 
with public information sharing rules.
The present analysis can be extended in several directions. In 
particular, an important extension is to consider the possibility of 
strategic revelation of information on sharing rules. This research 
assumes that the regime of private or public information on sharing 
rules is exogenously given. One can consider an extended model in 
which each group has the option of strategically revealing the sharing 
rules. Moreover, one may find “social dilemma” in which each group 
reveals its sharing-rule information. Accordingly, we leave this extension 
for future research. 
(Received 21 January 2019; Revised 16 May 2019; Accepted 9 June 
2019)
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